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Abstract: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)’s side accord – the 
1994 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)– has been 
portrayed as providing an ineffective, bureaucratic procedure for dealing with labor 
complaints about infringements of national labor legislation.  This paper reviews two 
decades of experience.  It argues that after an initial period of, formal activity, which 
did indeed expose the accord’s severe limitations, a new era of intensified 
international links at grassroots level commenced. Despite its limitations, the accord 
initiated positive learning processes and intensified exchanges between the trade 
union movements in the U.S., Canada and Mexico.      
 
 
This paper argues that tri-national labor cooperation has evolved, broadened, deepened and 
decentralised with progressive intensity under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The Agreement, which took effect in 1994 between the United States, Canadian 
and Mexican governments, represented an important neo-liberal initiative.  However, it also 
provided political opportunities for cross-border solidarity, especially under the provisions of 
its labor side accord–The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). 
Fundamental weaknesses in the accord’s labor dispute resolution mechanisms meant that 
only limited, direct opportunities were offered for labor solidarity. Yet in practice workers 
developed transnational collective repertoires of action.1  These had secondary and longer-
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term impacts which have revitalised autonomous, grassroots trade unionism and often cross-
border labor exchanges two decades later. 
Although NAFTA was the first regional economic integration agreement between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, the discussion has wider significance today.2A 
growing number of recent bilateral free trade pacts now contain supranational arbitration 
mechanisms like the NAALC’s as a basis for state-labor-capital dispute resolution and take 
the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (1998) as their guiding framework. The agreements include the Canada-Colombia Free 
Trade Agreement (2012), the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (2012) and bilateral 
agreements signed by the European Union. However, outside North America and the EU, 
labor movements tend to be at a much earlier stage in learning how to effectively utilise such 
labor side accords and dispute settlement mechanisms to improve workers’ rights. Thus, 
leaders and activists elsewhere may usefully reflect upon the lessons that can be learned from 
twenty years of campaigning around the accord in Mexico, the U.S. and Canada. 
While NAFTA was designed principally to benefit US and Canadian multinationals, 
many of their national policymakers were concerned that if too many of their corporations 
relocated their plants to their southern neighbour (where production costs were significantly 
cheaper and industrial regulation far weaker), it would damage their own economies and 
create unemployment. Therefore the NAALC labor side accord was incorporated into the 
broader Agreement and enabled activists, trade unions and civil society groups to mount legal 
challenges to a National Administrative Office (NAO) - that was to be established within 
each country’s labor ministry - in cases where the petitioners believed that domestic labor 
laws had been breached by multinationals operating there.3 Its inclusion allowed President 
Clinton to secure enough Democrat votes in the House of Representatives for NAFTA to 
obtain Congressional assent, while providing him with ‘political cover’ to execute the deal 
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without completely alienating his labor union sponsors.4 However, what made this significant 
was that under the auspices of the NAALC’s Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC), the 
procedures involved in raising complaints meant that alleged violations of domestic labor 
standards by a multinational could only be adjudicated by an NAO from one of the other two 
member states, not the one where the infringement had actually occurred. Thus the accord 
provided transnational ‘institutionalised political opportunity structures’ to contest the rules 
of global economic integration for the first time because it made communication, 
information-sharing and cooperation between the affected trade union or labor advocate that 
was making the petition and the unions, labor lawyers and anti-free trade coalitions in the 
third-party country of the review body essential.5 
Literature on the impact of regional economic integration institutions on transnational 
labor movements has, until recently, reflected two main debates. The first discusses how 
regional integration provides opportunities for transnational political mobilisation; the second 
addresses how effective ensuing transnational labor cooperation has been in concrete terms.6 
Work on NAFTA has paid particular attention to the extent to which the NAALC has 
achieved both these ends. 
The NAALC has been dismissed as an ineffective tool for achieving either goal 
because it does not establish minimum regional labor standards.7 On the other hand, NAO 
review bodies are open to political manipulation, and violations of fundamental labor 
standards such as the right of assembly, strike and collective bargaining are not subject to 
sanctions or binding arbitration.8These weaknesses have acted as such a deterrent that unions 
in the three countries filed just 39 cases under this process between 1994 and 2011. Only 
seven of these have reached the final ‘ministerial consultation’ stage and not a single one has 
generated sanctions.9 
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However, others have claimed that it is wrong to completely dismiss the NAALC 
petition process since NAOs provided an institutionalised channel for transnational 
engagement between North American unions.10By establishing a forum for exposing the 
inadequacies of national labor laws, it is argued that this process creates government 
accountability indirectly, because regardless of the outcome of the petition itself, the resulting 
bad publicity and scrutiny can be enough to force the alleged law-violating company to 
change its policy. For example, Nike’s directors acceded to the maquiladora 
(the Mexican name for manufacturing operations in a free trade zone) garment workers’ 
demand for an independent trade union in Kukdong in January 2001, when they recognised 
that Nike’s corporate image would suffer globally. However this was only after international 
activist networks and unions leveraged the original NAO petition to expose the company in 
the media.11 Moreover it is argued that the ‘Ministerial consultations’ that transnational union 
pressure succeeded in achieving following NAO arbitration, have had lasting legacies by 
ensuring that governments implemented their own labor legislation. 12  For instance, the 
outcome of the Han Young case (1997) led to a partial opening up of Mexico’s entrenched 
corporatist industrial relations system. Until then, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
only recognised pro-government labor actors such as the Mexican Workers’ Confederation 
(CTM), but was forced into providing a publically available portal that also promoted 
independent trade unions from that point onward. 
This article takes these debates forward and synthesises them with other literature. It 
illustrates how the experience of cross-border opposition to NAFTA caused Canadian, 
American and Mexican labor movements to reappraise their national organising structures 
and often inward-looking political perspectives to eventually adopt more internationalist 
outlooks. NAFTA may therefore be seen as a ‘transformative event ’that prompted these 
movements to realise their capacity to organise transnationally rather than resorting to 
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protectionist strategies. 13  It also shows that the cross-border alliances and collective 
repertoires of protest first acquired by labor activists during the early NAFTA years have 
developed into quasi-permanent mobilisation structures that still operate today.14 
 
The evolution of North American labor transnationalism.  Phase 1: Pre-NAFTA 
‘contingent and political’ alliances (1990–94) 
 
The drafting of NAFTA was announced in the early-1990s, igniting furious opposition from 
organised labor in the United States and Canada. The American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was concerned that low wages and ‘social 
dumping’ in Mexico would spark a flurry of plant relocations to their southern neighbour that 
would lead to job-losses and downward pressure on American wages. Meanwhile due to its 
experience with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988, the Canadian 
Labour Congress was sensitive to any further transfer of national sovereignty that would 
weaken its domestic labor standards.15 
Attempts to create broad, civil-society coalitions against the proposed free trade area 
quickly surfaced. The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM) mobilised 
communities on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border by targeting US-based multinational 
corporations. National anti-free trade networks also formed - the Alliance for Responsible 
Trade (ART) in the U.S., Common Frontiers (its Canadian equivalent) and the Mexican 
Action Network Against Free Trade (RMALC).16However, while these campaign networks 
were not labor-focused, they included federations like the AFL-CIO and individual unions 
like the United Auto Workers in the U.S. and Mexico’s Authentic Workers Front (FAT). As 
an independent  union confederation that also incorporates community organisations, peasant 
movements and women’s groups, FAT is committed to principles of internationalism, 
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workers’ self-management and training.  It operates in parallel to the official CTM 
confederation which, in contrast, the state uses to discipline the workforce and demobilise 
labor opposition.17However, without an institutional focal point to rally around in the years 
preceding the Agreement, the FAT struggled to persuade the main Canadian and American 
unions to form a tri-national anti-NAFTA labor alliance.18 Several hurdles confined such 
attempts at worker transnationalism to the periphery of the labor movement during these 
early stages; those initiatives that did emerge were mainly reduced to superficial ‘contingent 
political alliances’ whose objectives were often short-termist and did not extend beyond 
opposing NAFTA.19 
The CTM was by far the largest Mexican union confederation. However, its 
corporatist relationship with the government plus its genuine belief that NAFTA would help 
create millions of jobs through inward investment meant that it refused to participate in any 
cross-border labor opposition.20Dissident voices in Mexico were loud, but weak. Independent 
unions accounted for just 10% of all membership in the early-1990s and FAT itself boasted 
no more than 50,000 members. 21 The Mexican labor movement therefore remained 
ideologically dominated by the pro-NAFTA CTM, which also used nationalist rhetoric to 
deride the FAT as a tool of foreign unions wishing to prevent jobs from coming to Mexico. 
This accusation resonated powerfully in a society which was profoundly distrustful of US 
motivations ever since its interference in the 1910 Revolution. Thus, Mexican workers 
refrained from engaging in projects that promoted solidarity with their American 
counterparts, while the CTM’s hegemony over Mexican labor meant that both alternative 
unions and opposition to NAFTA were marginalised.22 
Moreover, in the years immediately before the Agreement’s 1994 implementation, the 
CTM’s nationalism was met by a resolutely protectionist stance from the AFL-CIO. As 
xenophobic cultural traditions permeated sections of the US labor movement, its leaders 
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tended to blame foreign workers for NAFTA-related job losses. 23 This divergence in 
perspectives between the dominant union confederations in Mexico and the U.S. illustrates 
how NAFTA actually exacerbated differences and aggravated tensions between union 
leaderships. Transnational labor resistance to NAFTA between 1990 and 1994 was further 
hindered by an exclusivity agreement and longstanding association between the AFL-CIO 
and the allegedly corrupt CTM through the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions.24This contributed to the AFL-CIO’s reluctance to build meaningful alliances with the 
very Mexican unions that were most active in opposing NAFTA. Additional impediments to 
the development of cross-border ties in the years preceding NAFTA’s implementation 
included language, cultural and resource-based disparities.25Finally, workers in the same 
industry in each country were often unionised in different ways, making it more difficult to 
identify the appropriate partner with whom to form alliances. Specific sectors were 
sometimes unionised in one country but not in another and industry-specific unions that 
operated under the centralised control of a governing confederation in one country were, at 
times, completely decentralised in another.26 
Thus, the only significant transnational labor relationships that emerged in the run up 
to NAFTA were confined both geographically to the U.S.-Mexico border area where the 
environmental damage and degrees of labor exploitation were experienced most intensely, 
and organisationally to those small and independent union federations that possessed more 
internationalist ideologies and which shared histories of cross-border labor cooperation prior 
to the Agreement. Notably, having lost 10,000 manufacturing jobs to Mexico in the 1980s, 
and foreseeing the potential for further large-scale job losses, the left-leaning, 
internationalist-oriented American union - United Electrical (UE), forged a partnership with 
FAT in 1992, to collectively bargain with their common employers at General Electric.27 This 
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Strategic Organising Alliance targeted US-owned maquila plants along the border areas in 
northern Mexico and blossomed into a sustainable, multi-layered and reciprocal relationship.  
The UE’s organising principle which convinced their members of the need for 
solidarity was astoundingly simple: relatively low wages in Mexico would inevitably result in 
American multinationals deciding to relocate, which would generate mass redundancies in 
US firms. Therefore, fighting for and supporting Mexican workers would not only help 
increase pay and improve conditions there, but would simultaneously preserve American jobs 
and relieve downward pressure on US wages due to the higher costs of relocation.28 Within a 
year of NAFTA coming into effect, the UE-FAT relationship had become the established 
model for such alliances and would soon help to transform relations within the broader North 
American labor movement. 
 
Phase 2: ‘NAFTA shock’ and élite labor transtionalisation (1994-99) 
 
Even NAFTA’s staunchest critics would concede that the treaty has broadly achieved its 
objectives, having successfully liberalised the regional flow of goods, services and capital. 
By 1999, tariff and non-tariff barriers had been removed on 65% of goods (with more 
sensitive industries such as agriculture and car manufacturing following by 2009) and the 
value of trade between the U.S., Mexico and Canada trebled between 1993 and 2007. Inward 
foreign direct investment increased five-fold over the same period.29 
In its promotion of unrestricted competition between workers, NAFTA also generated 
adverse effects on employment, wages and bargaining power in all three countries. Some two 
million mainly low-skilled manufacturing jobs were lost in the US and Canada during the 
first 10 years.30This was due to the Agreement’s tariff elimination stipulations that facilitated 
US and Canadian corporations’ moves to shift production and investment to Mexico, where, 
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to encourage them further, environmental regulation could be more easily avoided and labor 
costs were up to 10 times lower.31As American and Canadian unions realised the extent of 
job losses that had resulted from the treaty towards the late 1990s, it became obvious that 
their protectionist strategies had failed. They perceived an urgent need to adopt a 
transnational approach.32 
Mexican workers were even more severely affected. 33 Despite the Agreement’s 
architects promising that foreign investment would bring unprecedented growth for Mexico, 
the country’s per capita GDP declined in 1995 and barely increased during the 2000s.34It 
remained six times lower than that of the United States in 2010.35 Nor did the Mexican 
economy benefit, or its workers gain from NAFTA’s expected ‘convergence effects’. When 
President Salinas’ neoliberal administration abolished the ejido communal land-holding 
system (previously enshrined in the 1917 Constitution), millions of small farmers were 
evicted from their land and forced to migrate to the urban centres. Import tariffs and subsidies 
to domestic enterprises were also removed, leading many small and medium-sized firms to go 
bankrupt. The resulting sudden availability of hundreds of thousands unemployed small 
businessmen and farmers in the cities where maquila factories were based, helped depress 
manufacturing wages and growth. 36 Between 1995 and 1999, Mexican wages fell by 
approximately 24% and only returned to pre-NAFTA levels in 2006.37 
Of the new jobs created by NAFTA-induced investment, 98% were in the 
maquiladora sector where remuneration rates were up to four times lower than in other areas 
of Mexican manufacturing that pre-dated the Agreement.38This fuelled a downward spiralling 
of wages and greatly widened the wage gap between Mexican and US workers between 1994 
and 1996 by over fifty percent.39These negative impacts undermined the bargaining position 
of Canadian and American labor and aggravated the deterioration of working conditions in all 
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three countries. Even the CTM had little choice but to reverse its original belief that the 
NAFTA was a means to attain improved living standards for Mexican workers. 
The post-1994 period therefore represented an important second phase in the 
development of the transnational labor relationship because initial assumptions that Mexican 
workers would gain at the expense of their counterparts in the north proved unfounded. This 
dissipated tensions between organised labor on all three sides as common grievances 
emerged. This ‘political mobilisation effect’ paradoxically required Canadian and American 
unions to simultaneously fight for improvements to Mexican workers’ pay and 
conditions.40By the mid-1990s, cross-border solidarity began to extend beyond the usual left-
wing unions into a broader array of public sector and service-industry unions. From 1994, the 
existence of NAFTA’s labor side agreement also created new ‘institutional mobilisation’ 
opportunities.41 On the one hand, NAALC defined eleven common regional labor rights for 
the first time, helping workers to construct a collective, geopolitical identity across borders. 
On the other, it granted a legitimising power to North American unions to campaign to 
defend these rights because they were now legally recognised. Before NAFTA, they could 
easily be dismissed by governments or courts as unjustified campaigns inspired by little more 
than worker self-interest.42 
With the AFL-CIO and CTM uninvolved in the legal challenges made through the 
NAALC until later years, the FAT and the UE gained enormous prestige within their 
respective labor movements by pursuing the defence of national labor rights through the 
accord’s arbitration process.43 These marginal unions were soon brought into the spotlight, 
which in turn, forced key labor actors in the US and Canada to readdress their positions by 
seeking to emulate the FAT-UE model and develop their own transnational labor 
relationships, while also exploring the possibilities of resolving disputes through the 
NAALC’s resolution process.44 
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While the AFL-CIO continued to work closely with the CTM, from 1997, in a clear 
change of direction, its leaders finally began to meet with and provide assistance to the FAT 
and other independent Mexican unions.45 It aided Mexican flight attendants in numerous 
NAO cases and participated in virtually every NAALC petition filed since 1997.46 In the 
meantime, in Canada during the late-1990s, several unions either disaffiliated or demanded 
greater autonomy from their American-dominated international confederations. This 
facilitated more proactive stances in building relationships with independent Mexican 
unions. 47 The UE-FAT relationship became tri-national in 1997 when the Canadian 
Steelworkers Union (CUSWA) joined them alongside several other unions to form the Echlin 
Workers Alliance that supported auto parts workers to improve working conditions in all 
three countries.48 
The establishment of transnational North American labor relations can be attributed 
largely to political agency and to the role of several peripheral, autonomous, industry-specific 
and left-wing trade union organizations prior to the Agreement.  Yet it was the structural 
conditions that NAFTA occasioned which presented a sufficient ‘shock’ that prompted the 
larger, traditionally nationalist, central labor actors to reassess the regional free trade project 
and so broaden these relationships within these labor movements. A realisation of their 
common  interests with workers across the border, together with the ‘institutionalised 
political opportunities’ presented by the NAALC labor dispute resolution mechanism, 
brought them to engage more heavily in these attempts to construct transnational alliances.  
As Kay notes, this turn of events is unsurprising. 49 Analysts who emphasize the 
importance of institutions describe how legal or policy changes that provoke severe shocks to 
organizational fields often generate strategy transformations by organizations, including 
unions.50Social movement scholars have demonstrated how-as in this case-these behavioral 
shifts usually only happen once these threats become real rather than anticipated.51 
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Phase 3: The breakdown of NAFTA and the emergence of transnationalism from below 
(2000–13) 
 
NAFTA’s implementation therefore heralded a new, cooperative era in North American 
transnational labor relations during the late-1990s. In practice however, this burgeoning 
‘transnationalism’ remained largely confined to formal channels of engagement between  
union officials from International Secretariats, human rights groups and labor attorneys on 
different sides of the border, as significant resources were dedicated to the preparation of 
legal cases. Aside from participation in occasional solidarity demonstrations and pickets, 
rank-and-file workers were largely marginal. 
Yet these  interactions should be understood as the starting point from which more 
meaningful grassroots relationships blossomed. The political resistance that NAFTA spawned 
during the first two stages acted as a catalyst for ideological bonds, dialogue and mutual 
understanding between workers across the borders, especially after the  spaces for cross-
border cooperation that the NAALC provided diminished in the 2000s. 
Workers’ increased participation often arose out of disappointment with élite-level 
cooperation during NAALC-orientated union campaigns. When the Strategic Organising 
Alliance failed to achieve the desired outcomes following the result of the 1994 General 
Electric and Honeywell NAO petitions over the violation of freedom of assembly in the 
maquila plants, the sense of shared disillusionment persuaded FAT and UE activists to re-
evaluate the transnational labor project. They realised that in order to improve recruitment 
and organising among Mexican maquiladora workers, it was necessary first to increase these 
workers’ awareness of their rights. The two unions established the Education Center and 
Labor Workshop (CETLAC) in Juarez (on the U.S.-Mexican border), to provide civil, 
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political, labor and human rights training for the 230,000 workers and their families in the 
region’s 400 plants. It proved so successful that a second centre was opened in Nuevo Leon. 
The education programmes are now enjoying growing enrolment that extends far beyond 
factory plants and into the services sector, especially among taxi and local government 
workers.52 
The advanced stage of transnationalism shared among activists in the two unions is 
based upon a strong sense of mutual interest or ‘identification’.  It has partly been the product 
of sustained education programmes and rank-and-file worker exchanges, speaking tours and 
protest rallies.53 In taking information about labor rights and union organising back to their 
local communities and workplaces, stereotypes, cultural and linguistic barriers which had 
atomised their struggles are being addressed.  
A similar process occurred within the tri-national alliance between Mexican, 
American and Canadian Communication sector unions - the Mexican Telephone Workers 
Union (STRM), Communication Workers of America (CWA) and Communications, Energy 
and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP). When the Mexican NAO delivered what was 
interpreted as a disappointing result in 1995 over the right of association at a Sprint call 
centre in San Francisco, the three unions pledged to dedicate their resources to grassroots 
strategies of transnational resistance such as information-sharing and worker exchanges as an 
alternative to legal methods. 
Since the late 1990s, the ineffectiveness of NAFTA’s labor side agreement has 
reduced the number of cooperative activities organised by the accord’s Commission for 
Labor Cooperation from a peak of 16 in 1994, to just one or two annually between 2002 and 
2010. In the latter year, élite-level collaboration had declined to such a degree that the CLC 
office was closed indefinitely. Similarly, the number of annual petitions filed to the NAOs 
dropped dramatically. Although 10 complaints were submitted in 1998, not a single petition 
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was accepted for review between 2005 and 2011. This effectively rendered the NAALC 
process redundant.54 
Three key factors account for North American labor actors’ growing disillusionment 
with the NAALC process since 2000. First, its key institutions, the CLC and the NAOs, are 
not independent from the state, and when relatively pro-labor administrations in the US and 
Mexico were replaced at the end of 2000, by the conservative Republican and National 
Action Party (PAN)-led governments respectively, the Ministers and government officials 
who coordinated the process became more hostile to labor petitions.55This process deepened 
when Canada’s Conservative Party replaced the Liberals in 2006. The American Secretary of 
Labor, Elaine Chao reportedly refused to even meet with her Canadian and Mexican 
counterparts throughout her 2001-2009 term. 56  At the same time, Mexico’s new PAN 
government began to withdraw from CLC activities, arguing that the NAALC infringed its 
right to legislate on domestic labor issues. The failure of high-profile NAALC petitions to the 
US NAO deterred unions from raising further petitions, and consequently from élite-level 
legal engagement. 
Second, while the PRI’s electoral defeat seemingly provided new opportunities for 
Mexican unions to break with the corporatist system, President Fox soon sought to renew that 
tradition. By promising old union leaders that their privileged access to government would be 
maintained in exchange for their ‘guarantee of social stability,’ he was able to push through 
further neoliberal reform virtually unchallenged.57 The newly-installed PAN administration 
also responded to independent labor challenges with ferocious coercion, tightly controlling 
public meetings on labor issues and reducing possibilities for those endorsing transnational 
approaches. 
Finally, quasi-legal channels were almost completely abandoned as a form of cross-
border labor cooperation because of a general deterioration in state-to-state relations, 
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especially between the US and Mexico. 58Growing tensions over undocumented migrant 
workers and America’s erection of a long ‘security fence’ along the border in 2006 fuelled 
these antagonisms.59The signing of the 2008 Mérida Initiative between the two countries 
transformed the bilateral relationship into one that focuses on security issues rather than on 
trade and labor, and was symbolic of a shift in U.S. priorities since 9/11. The election of 
Obama in 2009 represented continuity rather than change in this respect.60 
These issues have exposed the accord’s susceptibility to national policy agendas, as 
well as its temporality as a means for providing a longer-term platform for labor solidarity. 
However, whilst traditional forms of labor protest – strikes, marches, boycotts and pickets - 
remain essential elements to both win industrial disputes and create transnational solidarity, 
disaffection with NAFTA’s institutional processes encouraged many grassroots activists to 
explore alternative forms of transnational contention. Aside from the CETLAC mentioned 
earlier, a plethora of largely unreported, bottom-up, independent and alternative mobilising 
vehicles for cross-border solidarity have flourished in recent years, bringing greater 
sustainability to transnational labor’s protest campaigns. 
Solidarity slogans have acquired a concrete form in the International Research 
Network on Autowork in the Americas (IRNAA), which promotes cooperation through 
educational and information exchanges between researchers and local trade unionists in each 
country’s auto industry.61 Its conferences and meetings have been particularly successful at 
building transnational solidarity, not only between workers affiliated to independent or 
militant unions, but in a major breakthrough, also among Mexico’s local CTM branches.  
They have thus started to make inroads into pro-government and nationalist sectors of the 
Mexican labor movement. Further, they provide an apolitical and autonomous space within 
which workers from different national and cultural backgrounds can meet in an atmosphere 
of tolerance and diversity to analyze contentious situations and plan joint actions.  IRNAA 
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has thus acted as a bridge-builder both between Mexican unions with polarized political 
stances and also transnationally between Mexico’s Auto unions and their US and Canadian 
counterparts. 
In 2011, 36 labor confederations, sector-based unions and labor rights organisations 
from Mexico, Canada and the USA formed the Tri-National Solidarity Alliance (TNSA), 
both as a response to the repeated failure of the NAALC to generate direct victories for 
workers and also due to an escalation of labor rights violations following the global financial 
crisis.62 This collective has an explicitly ‘internationalist vision of union struggle’ and asserts 
that the ‘structural causes of oppression are the same in Mexico, Canada and the United 
States.’ Not only have the AFL-CIO and the Canadian Labour Congress subscribed to this 
profoundly transnationalist project, but crucially, they openly criticize the CTM’s corporatist 
relationship with the PRI and Mexican government. Prior loyalties to the CTM appear to 
have been severed. While government-supported Mexican unions remain outside this 
initiative, eight independent unions have joined, helping to raise the international profile of 
labor rights abuses by employers and the persecution of independent labor activists in the 
Mineworkers Union (SNTMMSRM) and others by the Mexican authorities.  
Global solidarity campaigns to mark the homicide of 65 mineworkers at the Pasta de 
Conchos mine in February 2013 were spearheaded by U.S., Canadian and Mexican unions 
including the Mexican Electrical Workers' Union (SME), National Union of Technical & 
Professional Workers (UNTTYP), Continental Tires Workers, FAT, Canadian Autoworkers 
Union (CAW), United Steelworkers (USW), UE and the IndustriALL Global Union 
Federation. 63 Meanwhile, other independent solidarity organisations that pre-date the 
breakdown of the NAALC process, such as the Labor Education and Research Project and 
the CJM, continue to foster cross-border dialogue between unionised and non-unionised 
workers on the shop floor. 
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Lessons and legacies for labor transnationalism 
 
While these decentralised or autonomous transnational networks have emerged during Phase 
3, similar informal, grassroots collectives also existed during Phases 1 and 2.  Examples were 
Mujer a Mujer (an organisation of non-unionised female garment industry workers) and The 
North American Worker-to-Worker Network (a coalition that sponsored activists’ tours), 
which were especially active in NAFTA’s early days.64However, the difference was that 
NAALC’s deterioration shifted the focal point for transnational contention away from  
projects and towards rank-and-file initiatives and expanded the scale of such initiatives. 
These forms of interaction epitomise the sort of ‘mini-lateral’ links advocated by 
Croucher and Cotton for developing international union work.65They argue that small groups 
of activists from adjacent countries, especially where they conduct union educational 
activities, can raise their potential for collective action. Exogenously aiding these 
opportunities is the cultural hybridity - inadvertently promoted by NAFTA as an extension of 
existing ‘Tex-Mex’ culture - which began in the U.S.-Mexico border region during the 
maquila-boom of the 1990s, and has since been creeping into mainland USA.  Strong 
stereotyping nevertheless continues to exist, especially due to recent fears about Mexican 
immigration, and that lends greater significance to these activities.66 
One lesson which may be drawn from the FAT/UE/CUSWA alliance is that the 
success of future transnational labor relationships may depend upon a genuinely symmetrical 
relationship that moves away from framing Mexican workers as powerless ‘victims’.67 Well-
meaning ‘charitable’ gestures on the part of some American and Canadian unions sometimes 
prompt nationalistic responses in Mexico and have hindered the growth of solidarity because 
they are interpreted as expressions of ‘gringo’ superiority.68 A concrete example of the sort of 
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positive two-way relationship of solidarity has been at the AceCo plant in Milwaukee, where 
the UE relies upon Mexican FAT activists and expertise to help organize membership drives 
among its Mexican-American workers; it reciprocates by organizing solidarity marches and 
pickets in the USA, as well as assisting with strike funds to support the FAT when they take 
industrial action at AceCo plants in Mexico.69 
As President Obama looks to further expand and deepen free trade by creating a Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) which, when Mexico, Canada and Japan join, will effectively 
expand NAFTA to create the world’s largest trading bloc – it raises questions about what the 
legacies of transnational labor’s NAFTA campaigns for regional solidarity are.70 First, it 
appears that North American labor movements have learned from their failure to form a 
united opposition to the 1994 Agreement. National labor confederations in the US, Canada 
and Mexico – the AFL-CIO, CLC and National Union of Workers (UNT)71 respectively, 
have issued a joint statement opposing the TPP: ‘American, Canadian and Mexican workers 
cannot afford another corporate-directed trade agreement... the TPP must break from 
NAFTA, which imposed a destructive economic model that expands the rights and privileges 
of multinational corporations at the expense of working families’.72 
A further legacy is that when bilateral trade deals have been proposed between North 
American and Latin American states, like the US-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement 
(2007) or the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (2008), U.S. and Canadian unions have 
often forged new alliances with their southern counterparts to guarantee the provision of 
labor stipulations. Transnational union pressure has led to NAALC-modelled, supranational 
arbitration mechanisms for labor standards disputes being incorporated into many such 
agreements.  
Sustained, cross-border labor partnerships were able to enhance their mobilisation 
opportunities against NAFTA by uniting their campaigns, in what has been theorised as an 
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example of a Transnational Alliance System.73Such alliances require ‘support structures’ 
which help them elicit internal and external resources, raise issues and make allies. Here it 
has been argued that the NAALC’s citizen-participation mechanism to file cases for 
arbitration provided such a structure for North American labor to register contention and 
build solidarity over free trade issues. However, instead of acting as a support structure that 
aided these immediate campaigns, it has been proposed here that the accord’s petitions 
process fulfilled this function in terms of subsequent cross-border struggles.  It did so because 
it acted as a catalyst in the development of mutual trust between Mexican, Canadian and 
American workers that led unions and activists to create more permanent spaces for cross-
border solidarity. The Alliance Systems which emerged during the third phase outlined 
above, were decentralised and have helped to fortify NAFTA countries’ transnational labor 
efforts to oppose current attempts to expand the regional free trade area into the Pacific Rim. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the effectiveness of North American labor’s 
recent turn towards an internationalist trajectory remains hampered by (1) internal division 
and corporatist industrial relations structures in the Mexican labor movement, which will 
surely be reinforced by the PRI’s recent return to power following Enrique Peña Nieto’s 
victory in the 2012 Presidential Election, (2) low trade union membership rates of just 11% in 
the USA, 13% in Mexico and 29% in Canada as well as their hierarchical ‘business union’ 
practices(3) a generally weak culture of rank-and-file participation in union activities in each 
case, and (4) the fact that unions in all countries still negotiate collective bargaining 
agreements locally but remain largely regulated by national industrial relations 
regimes.74Until such time as these problems are overcome, the impact of transnational worker 
struggles will generally remain of secondary importance to national campaigns, despite 
holding enormous potential for international labor.75 
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Conclusion 
 
Ēlite-driven, regional economic integration projects which institutionalise the process 
of globalisation contain contradictions that provide potential opportunities for workers to 
construct transnational alliances to contest the increased intensity of their exploitation that 
such projects inevitably engender.  
It was precisely when formal, institutionalised and élite-level channels for cross-
border labor cooperation broke down during the early-2000s that activists began to 
understand that they required alternative, grassroots educational and mobilisation vehicles at 
transnational level in addition to strikes, pickets, demonstrations, boycotts and other forms of 
direct action. It was these that would strengthen and maintain transnational solidarity through 
troughs in the ‘protest cycle’76 beyond phases of heightened conflict. The experience of the 
last twenty years suggests that NAFTA has helped stimulate solidarity between labor 
movements in the US, Canada and Mexico. The assumption among Canadian and American 
workers that they would lose out to their Mexican counterparts proved to be unfounded, 
which opened spaces for more meaningful cooperation. 
The Agreement’s labor accord provided activists with a forum for cross-border 
organising and although its enforcement mechanisms were weak, the NAALC petitions 
process necessitated more regular and longer-term contact between unions in the three 
countries than had previously been the case. 77 Institutions that foster regional economic 
integration elsewhere such as MERCOSUR in South America, ASEAN in South Asia, and 
COMESA in Africa have not been able to generate longer-term transnational labor 
cooperation with the same degree of success, precisely because they have offered no 
meaningful participatory mechanism for expressing and redressing grievances when labor 
rights are violated. 
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The NAFTA experience also suggests that labor side accords are not primary vehicles 
for cross-border worker solidarity. Unlike other forms of transnational cooperation, legal 
activities confine participation to  groups of trade union officials and lawyers rather than 
rank-and-file activists.78 Nevertheless, they may still offer useful legal and political platforms 
for labor activists. They provide room to ameliorate the negative immediate effects of free 
trade agreements on labor standards and may also aid initial cross-border resistance. The 
transnational cooperation that they help to foster through these legalistic mechanisms is a 
necessary precursor for the development of deeper alliances between national trade unions.  
This is so because the interactions and trust that NAO petitioning generates between workers 
cross-nationally permit a mutual identification of interests. These provide the basis for 
longer-term autonomous and grassroots labor solidarity actions which may emerge 
organically and independently of the original institutionalised, top-down processes.  To this 
extent, they are starting to stimulate a number of counter-currents within neo-liberal 
globalisation.   
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